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John Rawls is arguably the most important political philosopher 
of the past century. His theory of justice has set the agenda for 
debate  in  mainstream  political  philosophy  for  the  past  forty 
years,  and has had an important  influence in economics,  law, 
sociology,  and  other  disciplines.  However,  despite  the 
importance  and  popularity  of  Rawls’s  work,  there  is  (rather 
surprisingly) no clear picture of what a society that met Rawls’s 
principles of justice would actually look like.
Much of the confusion arises from the frequent description of 
Rawls as a proponent of a redistributive welfare state regime. 
While  Rawls’s  principles  of  justice  do  provide  philosophical 
support  for  the  redress  of  existing  inequalities  and  for  the 
substantial redistribution of resources, it is incorrect to say that 
he favoured welfare state regimes in anything resembling their 
current  form.  In  fact,  Rawls  was  a  strong  critic  of  what  he 
termed  “welfare  state  capitalism”  and  an  advocate  of  an 
institutional  alternative  which  he  termed  “property-owning 
democracy.”  Discussion  of  “property-owning  democracy” 
occupied  only a  very small  part  of  his  seminal  A Theory  of  
Justice  (1971),  and  was  passed  over  entirely  in  Political  
Liberalism (1993).  But  in  his  final  statement  of  his  view of 
social  justice  (Justice  as  Fairness,  2001)  Rawls  provided 
pointed  and  explicit  (albeit  rather  brief)  discussion  of  the 
essential  contrasts  between  welfare  state  capitalism  and 
property-owning democracy, and explained why he believed that 
the welfare state could not in fact realize his two principles of 
justice. 
Nonetheless, the concept of property-owning democracy is not 
well  understood,  and is  still  only rarely treated as integral  to 
Rawls’s  theory  of  justice.  The  aim  of  this  review  article  is 
threefold.  First,  we  review  how  Rawls  and  his  leading 
interpreters  have  described  the  concept  of  property-owning 
democracy.  Second, we examine how the notion of “property-
owning  democracy”  has  recently  been  appropriated  by  non-
Rawlsian  political  philosophers  working  in  the  republican 
tradition,  who  have  developed  arguments  from non-Rawlsian 
premises  which  also  favour  the  widespread  dispersion  of 
property  ownership.  Third,  we  briefly  review  recent  work 
attempting to translate the general notion of a property-owning 
democracy into concrete institutional and policy proposals that 
might be adopted by advanced industrialized nations. 
A Theory of Justice and Property-Owning 
Democracy
The hugely ambitious aim of Rawls’s  A Theory of Justice is to 
specify a public understanding of justice appropriate to societies 
committed to both individual freedom and democratic equality. 
Rawls develops his theory of justice explicitly in opposition to 
utilitarianism, understood as a public philosophy which equates 
both goodness and justice with the maximization of aggregate 
human welfare. Rawls believed that utilitarianism provided an 
inadequate  philosophical  grounding  for  an  array  of  rights 
commonly associated with liberal democracies (such as freedom 
of  speech  and  other  civil  liberties)  and  also  failed  to  take 
individuals sufficiently seriously as important in their own right: 
a strictly utilitarian understanding of justice, for instance, could 
not preclude in advance depriving a minority of citizens of their 
liberties or denying them basic resources in order to advance the 
interests  of  the  majority.  As  Rawls  famously  put  it, 
“utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between 
persons.”1
Rawls  also recognized,  and was  concerned  to  counteract,  the 
force  of  traditional  objections  to  the  very  idea  of  justice, 
exemplified  by  Marx  and  other  skeptics  dating  back  to  the 
character  Thrasymachus  in  Plato’s  Republic.  In  this  view, 
“justice”  refers  simply  to  the  norms  and  rules  governing  a 
particular society—norms and rules which inevitably have the 
purpose and effect of justifying the  status quo and benefitting 
the ruling class of a given society. For instance, in Marx’s view, 
under capitalism,  there is  no  injustice,  as such,  involved in a 
laborer selling their labor time to a capitalist, who then exploits 
the laborer by appropriating the product of that labor and selling 
it  for  a  profit.  Under  capitalist  conceptions of  justice,  this  is 
simply a voluntary transaction, even if the labourer’s only other 
choice was living in extreme penury, or starving to death. On 
this view, conceptions of justice can only be internal to a given 
society, and cannot provide an independent standard for judging 
a society’s institutions. Those who are in charge set the rules and 
then they also get to call it justice.2
Similarly, our day-to-day judgments about what is just and fair 
can often be shaped and distorted by our own gender, race, and 
class position. Highly educated college graduates may be more 
likely to believe that those who have the best education should 
be given more money and power. Men may be more likely to 
1 Rawls (1971: 24). Page citations to A Theory of Justice in this article 
refer to the 1999 revised edition.
2 Whether Marx was as hostile to the idea of justice as some of his more 
dismissive comments suggest is a disputed question, and one Rawls 
examines at some length in his Lectures on the History of Political  
Philosophy. Rawls takes the view (drawing on the work of G.A.Cohen) 
that Marx does have a normative conception of justice underlying his 
analysis of capitalism, albeit one that is not explicitly expressed. See 
Rawls (2007): 335-371. See also G.A. Cohen (1989).
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believe that the disproportionate numbers of men in positions of 
power are a result either of men’s inherent superior fitness for 
such roles or the result of choices made by individual women 
not to pursue such positions. Middle-class people may be more 
likely to believe that the poor are largely to blame for their own 
condition, and managers at capitalist firms may be more likely 
to  believe  that  they should  have  the  right  to  issue  orders  to 
subordinates.
Rawls’s theory of justice aims both to provide an alternative to 
utilitarianism  and  an  answer  to  skeptics  who  believe  that 
impartial justice is impossible or that justice is at bottom a sort 
of disingenuous ‘code language’, designed to uphold the status 
quo.  The  principal  mechanism Rawls  invokes  to  develop  his 
conception of justice is the idea of the Original Position (OP). In 
the Original Position, independent individuals come together for 
the purpose of selecting principles  of justice  that  will  govern 
their entire society. In the OP, every individual will be under a 
“veil  of  ignorance”  with  respect  to  their  individual  identity: 
individuals  will  not  have  any  information  about  their  race, 
gender, class position, educational attainment, religious beliefs, 
and so on. They will know that they wish to live a self-directed 
life and to form and pursue a rational life plan, and they will 
know  that  they  need  certain  resources  (what  Rawls  calls 
“primary goods”) to pursue those plans; they will also be aware 
of  certain  basic  principles  of  psychology,  sociology,  and 
economics regarding the nature of human societies and how they 
operate (i.e., the notion that people’s behaviour is influenced by 
material incentives.) At the outset of A Theory of Justice, Rawls 
argues that the governing principles that would be chosen in this 
initial position should be regarded as just.3
Rawls argues that two principles of justice would be selected: 
roughly  speaking,  a  principle  of  liberty  and  a  principle  of 
equality.  The liberty principle calls for providing each citizen 
with “a fully adequate scheme of equal liberties, which scheme 
is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all.”4 What 
Rawls has in mind here principally are civil liberties and not (as 
in libertarian conceptions) the untrammelled right of individuals 
to profit from property holding or to enter into exchanges of any 
kind. The equality principle is twofold: all citizens are to have 
an equal opportunity to aspire to positions,  offices  and (more 
generally) social advancement (the “principle of fair equality of 
opportunity”); and inequalities between citizens are to be limited 
to those which maximally help the least well off group in society 
(the “difference principle”). Rawls accords absolute or “lexical” 
priority to the liberty principle and, within the equality principle, 
to  the  guarantee  of  fair  equality  of  opportunity  over  the 
enactment  of  the  difference  principle.  Thus,  subject  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  liberty  principle  and  the  other  part  of  the 
equality  principle,  political-economic  arrangements  must  be 
organized so as to  maximize the position of the least well  off 
relative to any other possible arrangement.5
3 Rawls (1971): 10-19. It is important to recognize, however, that Rawls 
does not regard the OP as static. If it can be shown that in the OP the 
agents will reach principles of justice conflicting with our considered 
judgments, then the description of the OP is to be revised so as to yield a 
different result. In effect, the OP functions as a mechanism for testing 
intuitions about just principles. For useful discussion, see Kymlicka 
(2002): 63-70.
4 Rawls (2001): 42. We quote here from the revised statement of the two 
principles presented in Justice as Fairness.
5 As Samuel Freeman puts it, the difference principle calls for selecting 
that political-economic system which tends over time to maximize the 
position of the least well off; and it calls for maximizing the actual 
position of the least well off within that chosen system. So the difference 
The “difference principle” therefore can be seen as having a dual 
function. On the one hand, it sets a limit (however vaguely) on 
the scope of acceptable inequalities. On the other hand, given 
plausible assumptions about the role of incentives in stimulating 
productivity, it effectively mandates inequalities, so long as such 
inequalities  maximally benefit  those at  the  bottom of society. 
Rawls, in effect, endorses an affluent society with inequality and 
a high standard of living for the worst off as superior to a poorer 
society with little inequality.  Here Rawls accepts the standard 
economist’s view that there is a trade-off between strict equality 
and efficiency, and that material inequalities provide incentives 
for spurring the effort of economic producers, potentially to the 
benefit  of  all.  Notably,  Rawls  also  rejects  the  notion  that 
inequality in itself is an overriding moral bad;6 what is bad are 
inequalities which cement the superior position of the most well-
off, or which generate social harms, such as the domination of 
one part of society by another, or the loss of self-respect among 
the badly off.7
Given this set of principles, the task for Rawls is to specify a 
political economy that would be consistent with basic individual 
liberties (such as the liberty to choose one’s employment and 
important liberties of political participation); that would provide 
substantially equal opportunities to all citizens; and that would 
limit runaway inequalities that create permanent classes or that 
undermine  the  notion  that  society  is  a  joint  system  of 
cooperation aimed at a common end. By the time of writing  A 
Theory of Justice¸ Rawls had already ruled out centralized state 
socialism as  a plausible vehicle  for  realizing these principles; 
state  socialism  (among  its  other  problems)  systematically 
violated  basic  liberties  (such  as  freedom of  employment  and 
political liberties). Rawls thus assumed that a just society must, 
in some sense, be a market society. But in A Theory of Justice, 
(and even more explicitly in  Justice as Fairness, to which we 
will turn later in this discussion) Rawls left open the question as 
to whether the just society would be either capitalist or socialist 
in  character.  A  just society  based  on  the  private  control  of 
capital, however, should take a different form than traditional or 
“really  existing”  capitalist  societies:  instead  of  the  control  of 
capital  being  highly  concentrated  among  a  narrow  band  of 
citizens, it should be dispersed as widely as possible. That idea 
represents the core kernel of “property-owning democracy.”
principle regulates both the broad choice of institutional arrangements 
and the selection of specific policies (i.e., taxes, transfers, labor laws) 
within a given arrangement. Importantly, Rawls does not equate 
maximizing the position of the least well-off with maximizing their 
incomes and wealth, but rather maximizing an index of the broader 
bundle of primary goods that affect one’s sense of self-respect and 
overall life chances. See Freeman (2007a): 102-109 and Freeman 
(2007b): 111-115.
6 Derek Parfit (1991) gives the label “Telic egalitarianism” to the view 
that inequality is in itself bad. On the rejection of “Telic egalitarianism” 
and for discussion of Rawls’s views regarding the badness of inequality, 
see Martin O’Neill, “What Should Egalitarians Believe?” (2008a). G.A. 
Cohen criticizes Rawls’s theory of justice on a closely related issue, 
regarding Rawls’s attitude to inequality (Cohen, 2008). In Cohen’s view, 
the inequalities permitted by the difference principle may be sensible, 
but should not be regarded as just. Cohen argues in effect that Rawls 
wrongly elides justice as such with more pragmatic concerns in 
developing his account of social justice. Even if Cohen’s critique is 
accepted, that does not make Rawls’s ideas about property-owning 
democracy any less interesting or important; it simply means (to take 
Cohen’s view) that we should regard it as an effort to specify what a 
real-world political economy that balanced justice against other 
important considerations looks like.
7 See Rawls (2001), pp. 130-2. See also Scanlon, (1996); O’Neill 
(2008a).
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Rawls on the Institutional Framework of a Just Economy
Rawls did not claim to have worked out the details of a political-
economic  regime  corresponding  to  the  idea  of  a  property-
owning democracy; his aim was simply to indicate the general 
outlines  of  the  sort  of  political  economy that  might  be  fully 
consistent with the principles of justice as fairness. Moreover, 
this outline is pitched at the level of ideal-type regime analysis 
in Rawls’s writings, and it thereby self-consciously passes over 
detailed questions of “political sociology” regarding how such a 
regime will function in practice.8
In  the  broadest  possible  terms,  a  property-owning democracy 
will  be  a  market  economy in  which  holdings  of  capital  are 
widely dispersed across  the  population.  The view is  that  fair 
equality  of  opportunity  and  limited  inequality  can  be  better 
achieved  through  a  more  broad-based  distribution  of  initial 
holdings rather than by relying on the mechanism of “after-the-
fact”  redistributive  taxation.  A  property-owning  democracy 
would be a “regime in which land and capital are widely though 
not  presumably  equally  held,”  in  which  “[s]ociety  is  not  so 
divided that one fairly small sector controls the preponderance 
of  productive  resources,”  and  which  is  able  to  “prevent 
concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value of political 
liberty and fair equality of opportunity.”9
In many respects, the institutional structure Rawls proposes in A 
Theory of Justice for a property-owning democracy is familiar to 
citizens  living  under  welfare  state  capitalism.  Rawls  assumes 
that  there  will  be  a  political  constitution  providing  basic 
liberties, a public sector that provides public goods (including an 
educational system that will provide “equal chances of education 
and culture for persons similarly endowed and motivated”), and 
a market and price system with a suitable system of regulation. 
Rawls goes on to specify five separate branches of government 
oversight, dealing with regulation of markets, macro-economic 
policy,  social  transfers  (with  each citizen guaranteed  a  social 
minimum),  the  distribution  of  property,  and  the  provision  of 
non-essential  public  goods.  The overall  picture  is  of a  mixed 
economy with  a  judicious  blend  of  market  mechanisms  and 
government  oversight,  embedded  within  a  system  of  basic 
liberties (such as freedom of career choice). 10
What,  then,  makes  property-owning  democracy  distinct  from 
welfare state capitalism? The distinction is to be found in the 
relative weight accorded in importance to “after-the-fact” social 
8 The most sustained discussion of property-owning democracy offered 
by Rawls can found in Chapter V, of A Theory of Justice (1971), 
especially section 43, and again in the Preface to the French edition of A 
Theory of Justice (reproduced as the preface to the revised edition of TJ, 
see especially at pp. xiv-xvi). The most systematic discussion comes in 
pages 135-140 of Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001). (The idea 
is given no attention at all in Political Liberalism [1993].) Given this 
paucity of discussion in Rawls’s formal published writings, the 
discussion here is particularly informed by four further sources. These 
include a pair of articles in 1986 and 1987 by Krouse and McPherson 
that pay attention to Rawls’s notion of a POD and try to draw out some 
of its implications (Krouse and McPherson, 1986, 1987); various 
publications by the British economist James Meade in the 1960s and 
1970s describing a “property-owning democracy”, from which Rawls 
explicitly takes the name for his preferred socioeconomic regime 
(Meade, 1965a, 1965b, 1975, 1993); work by one of Rawls’s prominent 
students, Joshua Cohen, specifying the problematic relationship between 
capitalism and democracy (especially Cohen, 1989); and finally, Rawls’s 
own recently published lectures on Karl Marx highlighting the contrast 
between Rawls’ conception of a just society organized as a property-
owning democracy and Marx’s ideal of communism (Rawls, 2007).
9 Rawls (1971): 247, 245.
10 Rawls (1971): 242-251; quotation on education at 243.
transfers relative to alterations in the distribution of property in 
achieving  a  relatively  egalitarian  economy.  Welfare  state 
capitalism aims at  providing an economic baseline as well  as 
certain  public  goods  (education,  health  care,  housing)  to  all 
citizens;  this  is  achieved  primarily  through  redistributive 
taxation  (what  Rawls  terms  transfers).  Property-owning 
democracy also aims  to  provide  an economic  baseline  to  the 
“least well off,” but it has a further goal as well: preventing large 
concentrations of wealth and dispersing ownership of property 
as  widely  as  possible.  One  might  say  that  welfare  state 
capitalism  simply  wants  to  provide  a  social  baseline  at  the 
bottom, whereas property-owning democracy also wants to put 
limits  on  accumulation  at  the  top,  thereby  narrowing  overall 
inequality  from  both  directions  (top  and  bottom).  Moreover, 
property-owning  democracy  is  also  concerned  to  engage  in 
redistribution  in  additional  dimensions:  i.e.,  not  just  the 
redistribution  of  income  characteristic  of  welfare  state 
capitalism,  but  also  the  redistribution  of  wealth  and  capital 
assets  (as  well  as  ensuring  a  more  equitable  distribution  of 
human capital).11
In terms of how such goals might be realized, Rawls points to 
inheritance taxes as the best mechanism for distributing property 
more widely and preventing large estates from being transferred 
in  whole  from  one  generation  to  another.  Here  Rawls  cites 
proposals for taxation on intergenerational transfers developed 
by economist  James  Meade;  persons  receiving  such  transfers 
would owe progressively higher taxes on these gifts according to 
how  many  such  gifts  they  had  received  over  their  lifetime. 
Rawls  does  not  stipulate  that  each  person  must  receive  an 
inheritance, and rejects the idea that there is an inherent injustice 
in some persons receiving more gifts than another (so long as 
this takes place within the framework of an overall system that 
is  just).12 For  Rawls,  inheritance  taxes  have  a  more  limited, 
though vital function: preventing large concentrations of wealth 
from  being  transmitted  inter-generationally.  This  aim  in  turn 
corresponds to  a  social  ideal  in  which there  is  no permanent 
class  of  politically  privileged  holders  of  wealth  and  capital 
sufficiently  powerful  to  extract  gains  for  itself  that  do  not 
function to benefit the least well off. 
Left Critiques of A Theory of Justice
As  noted  above,  Rawls’s  remarks  describing  his  favoured 
socioeconomic regime in  A Theory of Justice are rather sparse; 
Rawls devotes just 9 of the 514 pages of the book to discussion 
of “property-owning democracy,” and only mentions the term in 
the main text twice.  Perhaps as a result of the lack of detail on 
this  issue,  a  number  of  left-wing  critics  took  Rawls  to  be 
advocating welfare state policies which would enable capitalist 
processes  to  produce  as  much  as  wealth  as  possible,  while 
redistributive  processes  located  in  the  state  assured  that  the 
“least well off” received as much in the way of (compensatory) 
economic resources as economically feasible.13 The notion of a 
capitalist welfare state that could in fact maximize the position 
of the least well off immediately struck many critics on the left 
as implausible. In one of the best-developed early critiques of 
Rawls, Barry Clark and Herbert Gintis argued that Rawls relied 
11 As subsequent commentators have noted, such equalization of wealth 
and assets also has implications for how work is to be organized. See 
Hsieh (2009).
12 Rawls (1971): 245.
13 In Justice as Fairness, Rawls admits that the distinction between 
welfare state capitalism and property-owning democracy “is not 
sufficiently noted in Theory.” Rawls (2001): 135 n2.
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on citizens  holding  an  implausibly  expansive  sense  of  social 
justice,  in  order  to  facilitate  the  redistribution  required  to 
“correct” the inequalities generated by capitalism, so as to meet 
the  requirements  of  the  difference  principle.14 In  a  related 
critique, Gerald Doppelt argued that Rawls failed to appreciate 
the  impact  of  relative  economic  position,  particularly  in  the 
production  process,  on  the  generation  of  self-respect. 
Consequently,  Doppelt  suggested  that  the  different  ways  in 
which Rawls  treated the cases  of,  on the one hand,  civil  and 
personal  liberties  (which  are  to  be  distributed  equally,  as  a 
matter of assuring the conditions of self-respect for all) and, on 
the other hand, positions and power in the production process 
(which  can  be  distributed  unequally  without  undermining 
fundamental  self-respect),  was  normatively unjustifiable  when 
one  considered  the  effects  of  inequality  on  status  and  self-
respect.15 Likewise, David Schweickart argued that the logic of 
Rawls’s  theory  of  justice  should  have  led  him  to  embrace 
democratic  socialism  as  the  social  system  most  capable  of 
realizing his favoured principles.16
In  an  important  response  to  these  early  critiques,  Arthur 
DiQuattro  defended  Rawls  against  the  charge  that  he  is  a 
supporter  of  traditional  capitalism  or  of  a  system  of  social 
classes  (understood  in  the  Marxist  sense  of  the  term).  In 
particular,  DiQuattro  argued  that  Rawls  did  not  envisage  a 
society divided between owners and non-owners of capital; in 
short, Rawls did not endorse capitalism, and did not assume that 
the  allowances  made  for  socioeconomic  inequality  under  the 
second principle of justice necessitated a capitalist organization 
of production. In defending Rawls from these challenges from 
the left, DiQuattro quite properly called attention to the crucial 
distinction  Rawls  made  between  property-owning  democracy 
and capitalism.17
Shortly  thereafter,  Richard  Krouse  and  Michael  McPherson 
offered the first sustained effort in the literature to engage with 
what  Rawls  meant  by property-owning democracy.18 Drawing 
on both Rawls’s writings and James Meade’s efforts to describe 
a  property-owning  democracy,  Krouse  and  McPherson  show 
how both a concern for the fair value of the political liberties 
and the difference principle point in the direction of a regime 
that broadens property ownership directly, rather than a welfare 
state  dependent  on  large-scale  ex post redistributions to  limit 
inequality.  While  some  redistribution  via  taxation  will  be 
necessary  even  in  a  property-owning  democracy,  the 
fundamental  mechanism  for  achieving  an  egalitarian  society 
must  be to  “[limit]  the  concentration  of  property over  time.” 
Krouse  and  McPherson  then  went  on  to  pose  four  critical 
questions, quoted verbatim below:
1.  What  institutional  means  are  required  to  preserve  [an] 
egalitarian distribution [of property] over time (should it at some 
time be achieved), and indeed can adequate means be described?
2.  What  would life  in  a  property-owning democracy be like? 
Would  the  combination  of  (relatively)  egalitarian  property 
ownership and competitive markets produce a society that was 
acceptably ‘well-ordered’, harmonious, and stable?
14 Clark and Gintis (1978)
15 Doppelt (1981)
16 Schweickart (1979)
17 DiQuattro (1983)
18 Krouse and McPherson (1986, 1987)
3. Can a theory of justice illuminate the choice between the best 
private property regime—property-owning democracy—and the 
best socialist arrangements for providing justice?
4.  How can this characterization of the ideal property-owning 
democracy  help  to  guide  the  process  of  reform  in  existing, 
nonideal, private property societies?19
Justice as Fairness on Property-Owning Democracy
Well-developed  answers  to  each  of  the  questions  posed  by 
Krouse  and  McPherson  are  still  lacking  in  the  literature.20 
Indeed, in the 1990s, most critical debate about Rawls’s system 
of  justice  followed  the  agenda  set  by  his  own  Political  
Liberalism (1993), examining the question of whether a liberal 
egalitarian  account  of  justice  should  aspire  to  being 
“comprehensive”  as  opposed  to  merely  “political.”  Rawls 
argued that liberal principles of justice can in fact be endorsed 
by persons  with  widely  varying  comprehensive  religious  and 
philosophical  doctrines,  and  with  varying  conceptions  of  the 
good  life,  and  need  not  (and,  indeed,  must  not)  involve  one 
dominant  social  group  imposing  its  own  particular  value 
commitments  or  comprehensive  philosophical  doctrine  on 
others.
Accordingly, attention to questions of distributive justice and the 
idea of property-owning democracy faded to the background of 
the  debate  about  political  liberalism.  Indeed,  some  observers 
have  noted  an  internal  connection  between  Rawls’s 
argumentation  for  political  liberalism  and  the  reduced 
prominence of distributive justice in his writings: a generation of 
debate  among political  theorists  in  the  wake  of  A Theory  of  
Justice, as well as the strong rightward turn in politics in both 
the United States and the UK in the 1980s, made it abundantly 
clear  that  the  stringently  egalitarian  requirements  of  the 
difference principle  were unlikely ever  to command universal 
assent  among  philosophers,  let  alone  among  the  broader 
public.21 That political fact in turn calls into doubt the broader 
project of developing principles of justice that both have “real 
teeth”  and  that  could  also  be  widely  accepted  within  highly 
diverse modern societies.
Rawls himself at times seemed to downgrade the standing of the 
difference  principle  within  his  account  of  justice  in  Political  
Liberalism.22 For instance, Rawls argued that firm principles of 
distributive justice need not (and ought not) be written into the 
political  constitutions of just  societies,  and that application of 
distributive principles should be left to legislators. This aspect of 
Rawls’s view can be explained by his understandable reluctance 
to see complex social policy questions settled in the courts, but 
nevertheless his proposed solution could be seen as giving the 
realization of distributive justice a status that is contingent on 
the decisions and preferences of legislators (who Rawls assumes 
19 Krouse and McPherson (1988): 99-100.
20 A forthcoming volume edited by O’Neill and Williamson (2010) is 
intended to redress that gap. 
21 Chambers (2006)
22 Thus Simone Chambers argues that while “the difference principle 
lives on as Rawls’s favored interpretation of economic justice,” in 
Political Liberalism he no longer insists that “it is the only possible 
candidate for a fair principle.” Further, Chambers observes, “In addition 
to demoting its status within the theory, there is a more subtle fading 
away of the topic. Social justice is no longer front and center. His 
growing concern to find a view of justice that would be compatible with 
pluralism came to overshadow his deep commitment to egalitarianism.” 
Chambers (2006): 86.
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will  accept  and seek to  implement  the  difference principle).23 
Given that really-existing democratic politics is rarely, if ever, 
characterized by consensus on fundamental principles of justice, 
especially  in  the  context  of  countries  like  the  United  States, 
leaving the difference principle’s fate in the hands of democratic 
politics  has  struck  some  commentators  as  tantamount  to 
abandoning  it.24 That  note  of  ambiguity  in  turn  signalled  a 
broader tension within Rawls’s theory: whether Rawls intended 
his theory of justice to reflect the self-understanding of existing 
democratic  societies  (an  interpretation  lent  support  by  his 
engagement with the tradition of American constitutional law in 
Political Liberalism)  or whether  he intended the theory to be 
critical of existing institutional practices as well as inegalitarian 
social  views.  One  can  also  see  this  tension  as  embodying  a 
broader tension between some of the different roles that Rawls 
identifies  for  political  philosophy:  for  example,  between  the 
fundamentally progressive enterprise of identifying a “realistic 
utopia”, as against the less radical, Hegelian task of offering a 
“reconciliation” to our existing social world.25
It  is  thus a  striking fact  than in  his  final  sustained statement 
about justice, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), Rawls 
‘lays down his cards’ so to speak: more than in any previous 
book,  he  makes  it  clear  that  he  believes  that  contemporary 
capitalist societies, especially the United States, have veered far 
away from realizing liberal  principles  of justice.  It  is  here as 
well that we find the most detailed contrast between, on the one 
hand, welfare state capitalism, which Rawls rejects, and, on the 
other hand,  property-owning democracy and liberal  socialism, 
both of which he is prepared to endorse. Rawls argues that either 
property-owning democracy or liberal socialism could in theory 
realize principles of justice, and argues that the choice between 
the two should be made on the basis of contingent historical and 
cultural  factors.  The  implication  seems  here  to  be  that  in 
societies like the  United States,  with weak socialist  traditions 
and a strong cultural emphasis on entrepreneurial individualism, 
property-owning  democracy  is  the  more  likely  vehicle  for 
realizing the just society (with liberal socialism perhaps a more 
suitable  option  in  societies  with  more  collectivist  political 
cultures or stronger socialist traditions).
In  an  equally  striking  move,  Rawls  in  Justice  as  Fairness  
(approvingly citing Krouse and McPherson) rests the argument 
for  property-owning democracy not  primarily in  terms of the 
demands of the second principle of justice, but rather in terms of 
the  first  principle.  Rawls  argues  that  the  widespread  political 
inequalities  generated  by welfare  state  capitalism represent  a 
systemic violation of the “fair values of the political liberties.” 
Unlike  other  liberties,  the  fair  value  of  the  political  liberties 
must be distributed equally;  a society in which this is not the 
case cannot be considered to be either self-governing or free.26 
23 Rawls (1993). Importantly, however, Rawls does treat provision of a 
social minimum “providing for the basic needs of all citizens” as a 
constitutional essential; see Rawls (2003), pp. 228-29.
24 Thus see Thomas (2009), who argues for constitutionally 
guaranteeing the fair value of the political liberties. Such a constitutional 
guarantee, in his view, would preclude democratic politics from 
sanctioning excessive inequalities, while avoiding the need to lock in 
place any particular institutional scheme designed to realize property-
owning democracy. See also J. Cohen (2003) for a critique of Rawls’s 
supposition that consensus can be reached on the content of justice in 
actual democratic polities.
25 See Rawls, (2001), pp. 1-5.
26 In A Theory of Justice Rawls also connected arguments for 
inheritance taxes to the requirement of maintaining the fair value of 
political liberties, as well for realizing fair equality of opportunity. There 
Rawls states that “it seems” that “a wide dispersal of property is a 
This move is important  both for  its  own sake and because it 
means that Rawls’s arguments for property-owning democracy 
are  thereby  not  solely  contingent  on  acceptance  of  the 
controversial  difference  principle.  Nonetheless,  as  well  as  its 
falling short with regard to the first principle, Rawls also makes 
clear  that  a  predictable  consequence  of  the  concentration  of 
wealth  and  political  power  characteristic  of  welfare  state 
capitalism is that such polities rarely if ever are able to enact 
redistributive  policies  sufficiently  strong  to  establish  and 
maintain  intergenerational  equality of  opportunity,  or  to  limit 
objectionable inequalities which serve no social purpose other 
than the enrichment of the already privileged. 
According  to  Justice  as  Fairness, one  of  the  main  aims  of 
property-owning  democracy  is  “to  prevent  a  small  part  of 
society from controlling the economy,  and indirectly,  political 
life as well…
Property-owning democracy avoids this, not by the 
redistribution of income to those with less at the end of 
each period, so to speak, but rather by ensuring the 
widespread ownership of assets and human capital 
(that is, education and trained skills) at the beginning 
of each period, all this against a background of fair 
equality of opportunity. The intent is not simply to 
assist those who lose out through accident or 
misfortune (although that must be done), but rather to 
put all citizens in a position to manage their own 
affairs on a footing of a suitable degree of social and 
economic equality. (Rawls, 2001: 139).
Rawls goes onto describe POD as a socioeconomic system with 
at least the three following institutional features:
(1) Wide Dispersal of Capital: The sine qua non of a POD is 
that it would entail the wide dispersal of the ownership of the 
means of production, with individual citizens controlling 
productive capital, both in terms of human and non-human 
capital (and perhaps with an opportunity to control their own 
working conditions). 
(2) Blocking the Intergenerational Transmission of 
Advantage: A POD would also involve the enactment of 
significant estate, inheritance and gift taxes, acting to limit 
the largest inequalities of wealth, especially from one 
generation to the next. 
(3) Safeguards against the Corruption of Politics: A POD 
would seek to limit the effects of private and corporate 
wealth on politics, through campaign finance reform, public 
funding of political parties, public provision of forums for 
political debate, and other measures to block the influence of 
wealth on politics (perhaps including publicly funded 
elections).
Policies of type (3) should be viewed as being in place with an 
eye on the protection of the fair value of the political liberties, 
and are therefore closely connected with creating a regime that 
is in accord with Rawls’s first  principle of justice. Policies of 
type (1) and (2) should, in contrast, be viewed as providing the 
means  for  institutionalizing  the  demands  of  Rawls’s  second 
principle of justice. Through a combination of all three kinds of 
policies,  Rawls  aims  to  specify  a  social  system that  has  the 
necessary condition . . . if the fair values of the basic liberties are to be 
maintained.” Rawls (1971): 245-46. But this connection is foregrounded 
to a greater degree in Justice as Fairness, where he makes it the primary 
focus of his critique of welfare state capitalism.
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capacity to overcome the structural limitations of welfare state 
capitalism  in  delivering  a  fully  just  set  of  socioeconomic 
arrangements. 
Recent Commentary on Rawls’s Conception of Property-
Owning Democracy
Spurred  on  in  part  by  the  striking  arguments  of  Justice  as  
Fairness,  property-owning democracy has  received  increasing 
attention  in  recent  years  from  liberal  egalitarian  political 
philosophers. (To be sure, in many accounts of Rawls’s social 
and political thought, property-owning democracy is discussed 
only briefly, if it is mentioned at all.) 27
Discussions of the dilemmas of contemporary liberal egalitarian 
politics offered by Simone Chambers and Will Kymlicka each 
stress  Rawls’s  critique  of  the  welfare  state  and  the  implicit 
radicalism  of  property-owning  democracy.28 In  recent  papers, 
both Ben Jackson and Amit Ron trace the intellectual origins of 
“property-owning democracy” phrase to the early 20th-century 
British conservative Noel Skelton; Jackson suggests that James 
Meade’s use of the term (subsequently picked up by Rawls) was 
a  deliberately  ironic  attempt  to  invert  the  meaning  of  what 
hitherto  had  been  a  conservative  idiom.29 Samuel  Freeman 
argues that Rawls’s preference for property-owning democracy 
vis-à-vis  the  welfare  state  parallels  his  preference  for  the 
“liberalism of freedom” of Kant and J.S. Mill, in which citizens 
take an active role in developing their capacities, as opposed to 
the  “liberalism  of  happiness”  associated  with  classical 
utilitarians  such  as  Bentham.30 Freeman’s  extremely 
comprehensive treatment  of the full  range of Rawls’s thought 
also  contains  a  relatively extended  account  of  the  distinction 
between  welfare  state  capitalism  and  property-owning 
democracy.31 In a related vein, Nien-hê Hsieh draws on Rawls to 
argue the case  for  what  he terms “workplace  republicanism,” 
i.e., the introduction of workplace democracy and limitation of 
arbitrary  managerial  authority;  in  Justice  as  Fairness,  Rawls 
forwarded  some  suggestive  though  noncommittal  comments 
about  the  potential  importance  of  workplace  democracy  in 
helping to realize a just society.32 This aspect of Rawls’s thought 
has also been picked up by Martin O’Neill, who explores, in a 
recent  article,  what  he  terms  “three  Rawlsian  routes”  for 
defending some form of economic democracy as a precondition 
for a just socioeconomic order.33
Most recently, papers by Hsieh, O’Neill, Waheed Hussain, and 
Thad Williamson have further developed both the basic idea of 
property-owning democracy and have also subjected the concept 
to  critical  scrutiny.  Hsieh  focuses  on  the  role  of  work  in  a 
property-owning  democracy;  Hussain  compares  property-
owning democracy to  what  he  terms  democratic  corporatism; 
O’Neill offers a partial critique of Rawls’s arguments against the 
welfare state; and Williamson describes how a wide dispersal of 
real estate, cash, and capital might be actually institutionalized 
and sustained in a property-owned democracy.34 A forthcoming 
volume on property-owning democracy, edited by O’Neill and 
Williamson,  will  take  the  arguments  of  a  number  of  these 
philosophers forward, as well as include the work of a number 
27 See Pogge (2006); Audard (2007). 
28 Chambers (2006); Kymlicka (2002).
29 Jackson (2005); Ron (2008) 
30 Freeman (2007a).
31 Freeman (2007b).
32 Hsieh (2005).
33 O’Neill (2008b)
34 Hsieh (2009); Hussain (2009); O’Neill (2009); Williamson (2009).
of other writers, each giving further elaborations and critiques of 
Rawls’s  ideas regarding the institutional basis of a just  social 
order.35
Non-Rawlsian Arguments for Property-Owning 
Democracy
Property-Owning Democracy and Market Socialism
The idea of a market economy based on a wider dispersal of 
capital than is characteristic of contemporary capitalist societies 
is not unique to Rawls or to the debate he stimulated; nor is the 
general search for a plausible alternative to capitalism in light of 
the historic failure of centralized state socialism. Indeed, since 
the  late  1980s,  political  economists  and  philosophers  have 
detailed  a  variety  of  proposals  for  a  market  socialist  society, 
proposals that typically offer far more specificity and attention 
to institutional detail than the general comments about property-
owning  democracy  offered  by  Rawls.  Particularly  cogent 
formulations  are  those  of  Joshua  Cohen,  David  Miller,  John 
Roemer,  David  Schweickart,  and  Gar  Alperovitz.36 Typically, 
these  proposals  call  for  some  form  of  community  or  public 
ownership of capital within a market model, while also allowing 
for broadly democratic planning of the economy as a whole. In 
most cases (Roemer is an exception), these proposals also call 
for giving workers effective democratic control of most or all 
enterprises.  Notably,  these  models  do not  require  or  advocate 
political revolution, but assume the constitutional framework of 
liberal  democracy;  nor  do  they  challenge  the  market  as  a 
mechanism of resource allocation, even when the models allow 
for  significant  degrees  of  government  planning.  What  these 
versions  of  liberal  democratic  socialism  do  insist  upon  is 
changing who owns and reaps dividends from capital.  To this 
extent,  proposals  for  liberal  democratic  socialism  bear  a 
significant  resemblance  to  Rawls’s  conception  of  a  property-
owning democracy.37
Republicanism and Property-Owning Democracy
Also of relevance are recent discussions by republican political 
theorists  concerning  the  content  of  a  republican  political 
economy (or  “commercial  republic”)  which  also  point  in  the 
broad  direction  of  dispersing  capital  more  widely.38 The 
proposals  of  American  political  theorist  Stephen  Elkin  are 
particular  noteworthy,  for  two  reasons:  first,  he  specifically 
rejects the  Rawlsian paradigm for  thinking about  politics and 
instead takes James Madison as his starting point for reasoning 
about the content of a commercial republic; second, he explicitly 
uses the language of property-owning democracy. Consequently, 
the following section of our discussion pays particular attention 
to Elkin’s non-Rawlsian arguments for a POD.
The core premise of republican approaches to political theory is 
that in thinking about politics, it is not enough only to specify 
the  moral  foundations  of  legitimate  government,  or  the 
normative principles (including principles of social  justice) to 
35 O’Neill and Williamson (forthcoming, 2010).
36 Cohen (1989), Miller (1991), Roemer (1993), Schweickart (2000), 
Alperovitz (2004).
37 To be sure, prominent differences between the two proposals remain. 
In particular, unlike most forms of democratic socialism, Rawls’s 
property-owning democracy has no role for democratic oversight or 
planning of major capital investments. For further discussion, see 
Williamson (2009). 
38 Dagger (2006); Elkin (2006).
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which government should aspire. Rather, we must think about 
how  to  construct  and  maintain  a  regime  that,  despite  the 
presence of at least partially self-interested actors, succeeds in 
preventing the domination of any one group of citizens by any 
others, via either private or public means, while also allowing all 
citizens meaningfully to contribute, via the political process, to 
influencing  the  social  conditions  which  shape  their  lives. 
Constructing such a regime requires paying careful attention to 
institutional  design;  to  how  leaders  are  selected  and  to  the 
incentives that they are offered; to the character and engagement 
of  the  ordinary citizens  who are  charged  with  both  selecting 
leaders  and  holding  them accountable;  and,  not  least,  to  the 
regime’s political economy and how it functions, including the 
distribution of wealth that it generates.
Civic  republicans,  especially those who draw their inspiration 
from Madison and other regime theorists such as Machiavelli 
and Montesquieu,  characteristically argue that  reasoning from 
the original position, in the Rawlsian style, can take us only so 
far  in  telling  us  what  a  workable  and  tolerably just  political 
regime might look like. More than this, such republicans reject 
proposals for a “division of labour” within political theory, such 
that  some  scholars,  expert  in  pre-institutional  political 
philosophy  and  abstract  reasoning,  define  and  specify  the 
normative principles which should guide political life, while a 
second group of scholars, who look more carefully at the facts 
of the world, work out how to put those principles into practice. 
From the viewpoint of republicans such as Elkin, such a division 
of labour is untenable: Elkin argues that we cannot fully make 
sense of political concepts such as “liberty” and “equality” until 
we have thought through, and indeed garnered some practical 
experience with, what it would mean to realize such values in 
practice, through real political institutions. Put another way, we 
cannot claim that we want something unless we understand what 
it  would  truly to  take  to  get  it,  in  practice,  given  reasonable 
assumptions about human nature.39 One of those assumptions, in 
turn,  is  that  political  actors  often  act  from  mixed  or  self-
interested motives, as opposed to being motivated by the desire 
to realize justice.40
39 Thus Elkin: “In the context of [institutional] practice, there aren’t two 
separate judgments—one about values, the other about practices that 
will serve them. There is only one: how much we value something given 
what it takes to realize it.” Elkin (2006): 77.
40 To be clear, Rawls also recognizes the importance of considering the 
institutional implications of a conception of justice before accepting it. 
Hence Rawls writes: “It is important to trace out, if only in a rough and 
ready way, the institutional content of the two principles of justice. We 
need to do this before we can endorse these principles, even 
provisionally. This is because the idea of reflective equilibrium involves 
our accepting the implications of ideals and first principles in particular 
cases as they arise. We cannot tell solely from the content of a political 
conception—from its principles and ideals—whether it is reasonable for 
us.” Rawls (2001): 136. This recognition on Rawls’s part is important, 
but is not sufficient to satisfy Elkin’s objection, on two grounds. First, 
Rawls limits his account of the institutional content of property-owning 
democracy to ideal-type regime analysis—even though he acknowledges 
the possibility that “a basic structure may generate interests that make it 
work very differently than its ideal description.” Rawls (2001): 137. 
Considerations of the kinds of interests a regime might generate are, 
according to Rawls, questions of “political sociology” and not 
something that accounts of ideal-type regimes need to consider. In 
Elkin’s view, in contrast, careful consideration of the interests a regime 
is likely to produce and how they might be held in balance so as to 
maintain the regime and achieve its stated values over time is precisely 
what “constitutional” thinking must take up. Second, as stated in the 
text, Elkin rejects Rawls’s view that the premise of a general agreement 
about the content of justice and the assumption of “full compliance” are 
useful beginning points for thinking about a workable constitutional 
regime.
This  approach  to  politics  is  exemplified  in  Stephen  Elkin’s 
recent  book  Reconstructing  the  Commercial  Republic.  Elkin 
describes the “circumstances of politics” as involving a “large 
aggregation  of  people  who  1)  have  conflicting  purposes  that 
engender more or less serious conflict; 2) are given to attempt to 
use political power to further their own purposes and those of 
people with whom they identify; 3) are inclined to use political 
power  to  subordinate  others;  and  4)  are  sometimes  given  to 
words and actions that suggest that they value limiting the use of 
political  power by law and harnessing it  to public  purposes.” 
“These  circumstances,”  Elkin  adds,  are  not  “`the  best  of 
foreseeable  conditions.’ They  are  simply  the  conditions  that 
obtain  as  we  Americans,  like  others,  go  about  our  political 
business.”41
Elkin  argues  that  James  Madison’s  theory  of  a  “commercial 
republic”—a liberal regime characterized by government that is 
at once popular, limited, and active—has six central elements. 
The first five include preventing faction, preventing a tyranny of 
lawmakers, ensuring that lawmakers consider the public interest, 
ensuring  that  lawmaking  has  a  meaningful  deliberative 
component,  and  ensuring  a  measure  of  civic  virtue  in  the 
populace.  For  purposes  of  the  present  discussion,  the  key 
element is the sixth—namely, the “social basis for the regime,” 
or  in  other  words,  who  has  property  and  thereby  political 
influence in the society, and thereby the capacity to shape how 
the regime operates in practice.42
Madison’s political  theory rested heavily on the possibility of 
“men of property and substantial  community position”—most 
often large landowners—coming to take a very broad view of 
their  own  interests.  Suppose  the  public  interest  and  the 
(enlightened) self-interest of these men overlapped substantially, 
and that these same “men of property” were in a position to have 
disproportionate political influence—for instance, by being the 
predominant class from which elected representatives would be 
chosen.  If  this  were  the  case,  and  if  the  political  institutions 
themselves  were  designed  to  give  lawmakers,  including  the 
ambitious, strong reason to appeal to the public interest, then a 
deliberative politics that in fact served the public interest might 
be possible.43
As  Elkin  notes,  this  Madisonian  account  is  a  deeply 
unsatisfactory theory for contemporary liberal regimes. Broad-
minded “men of landed property and standing” are no longer the 
dominant  social  class;  instead  we  have  the  predominance  of 
corporate  property,  and  corporations  are  themselves  legally 
required to have quite narrow interests. Moreover, if inequalities 
of wealth and income become excessive, and these translate into 
significant political inequalities, as they in fact often do, then we 
face the spectre  of not,  as  Madison feared,  factional  majority 
rule, but rather factional minority rule by the wealthy and the 
well-off. So the problem remains—what is to be the social basis 
of a political regime based on self-rule and limited but active 
government?44
41 Elkin (2006): 254-55. Elkin here is quoting Rawls (1993): xvii. It 
might be noted that Rawls, beginning in Political Liberalism, does 
revise his theory so as to take account of one major fact about the world, 
namely, the fact of reasonable pluralism. For a republican like Elkin, the 
question is why Rawls stops there as opposed to taking account of other 
prominent facts as well (such as large-scale corporate power). See Elkin 
(2006): 359-360, n10. For a related critique, see Sheldon Wolin’s (1996) 
critical review of Political Liberalism.
42 Elkin (2006): 21.
43 Ekin (2006): 38-42.
44 Ekin (2006): 51-73. Elkin’s argumentation on these themes is more 
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Elkin’s answer is fourfold. First, a commercial republic should 
be  a  regime  in  which  the  middle  class  is  the  politically 
predominant  class,  and can serve as a “pivot”  in adjudicating 
conflicts between business elites and the poor; in particular, it is 
important that the middle class have enough power to force the 
business elites to justify their proposals in terms of the public 
interest.  Second,  excessive  inequalities  of  wealth  are 
inconsistent  with  the  maintenance  of  a  commercial  republic, 
precisely  because  they  translate  into  inequalities  of  political 
influence  and  make  relations  of  mutual  respect  between  all 
citizens  impossible.  Third,  persistent  poverty  as  well  the 
economic insecurity of the near-poor and much of the middle 
class are inconsistent with the formation of independent, self-
respecting  citizens  who  recognize  the  value  of  deliberative 
politics. As Elkin puts it, “To worry about whether you can pay 
your  bills  wonderfully  concentrates  your  mind—but  not  on 
political life.”45 Fourth, the interests of property-holders should 
be  broadened  to  the  greatest  possible  extent;  this  could  be 
achieved by broadening the ownership of property and capital, 
and  by fostering  a  politically  strong  middle  class  capable  of 
challenging elite proposals, such that elite groups must argue on 
their behalf by appealing to the public interest.
Consequently,  Elkin  writes,  “in  a  fully  realized  commercial 
republic, the fruits of prosperity should not be available only to 
a few; neither should economic production be in the service of 
creating an oligarchy with the status and material comforts of an 
aristocracy.”46 Elkin thus proposes ensuring that work is better 
paid, as well as advocating the more effective use of inheritance 
taxes,  and  above  all  widening  the  distribution  of  capital—in 
short,  much  of  the  agenda  of  what  Rawls  terms  “property-
owning democracy.”47
This  focus  on  capital  as  opposed  to  income  as  the  focus  of 
redistributive efforts has in turn four further justifications: first, 
the  link  between  accumulated  capital  and  disproportionate, 
dangerous and factional political power; second, the observation 
that  private  relationships  of  domination  rest  on  the  divide 
between  those  with  capital  and  those  without,  not  the  divide 
between  higher-paid  and  lower-paid  workers;  third,  the 
recognition that it is impossible to contain inequalities of income 
without also paying attention to inequalities in asset holdings; 
and fourth, the political judgment that it is all but impossible as 
a  practical  matter  to  allow  the  market  to  generate  wide 
dispersions of rewards, and then to rely upon the tax system to 
correct  the  resultant  inequalities  to  a  tolerable  level.  The 
beneficiaries  of  socioeconomic  inequality  are  not,  and  never 
plausibly will be, so committed to social justice that they will 
endorse  large-scale  redistributions of  their  own incomes on a 
regular basis. On the contrary, they will insist on the justice of 
keeping their  own market-generated returns,  a claim that will 
have strong resonance among the well-off. A regime that relies 
less on post-transfer taxation to achieve a tolerable measure of 
socio-economic  equality  will  be  more  stable  over  the  long 
term.48
complex and nuanced than this brief summary can do justice.
45 Elkin (2006): 134.
46 Elkin (2006): 134.
47 Elkin (2006): 292-96. Indeed, Elkin’s discussion goes significantly 
beyond Rawls’s own proposals, drawing on some of the ideas (such as 
universal capital grants and support for worker ownership of firms) 
discussed in subsequent literature (see main text, below, for a brief 
review).
48 To be sure, moving towards a broader distribution of capital and 
property also would face formidable political obstacles. The view is that 
if a suitably wider distribution could be achieved, this would be a more 
Here  we  have  a  second  set  of  arguments  for  moving  in  the 
direction  of  property-owning  democracy.  Clearly,  there  is 
overlap between some of Rawls’s reasoning and that of Elkin, 
particularly  in  Rawls’s  stress  on  the  fair  value  of  political 
liberties. What is worth noting here is simply that one need not 
share any commitment to the Rawlsian edifice, or to a mode of 
political thinking that uses the ideal conditions of the original 
position as a starting point for reflection, to reach the judgment 
that persons interested in tolerably just  liberal  regimes should 
take  an  interest  in  property-owning  democracy.  In  short, 
property-owning democracy need not be regarded as a uniquely 
Rawlsian  idea,  but  instead  may  plausibly  be  endorsed  by 
adherents of a range of sophisticated theories concerning the just 
society.
Policies to Broaden Property Ownership
The  idea  of  property-owning  democracy  has  thus  enjoyed 
renewed attention from multiple strands of democratic political 
theory in  recent  years.  Parallel  to  this  development  has  been 
increased interest among policy scholars and some practitioners 
in “asset-based” policy approaches to redressing poverty.  The 
basic  thought  behind  asset-based  approaches  is  that  social 
policies should not rely only on efforts to prop up low incomes 
amongst the poor, but should also enable the disadvantaged to 
gain access to productive assets that might significantly improve 
their long-term life chances. Examples of such assets including 
savings accounts, educational funds, housing, pension funds and 
automobiles.49 To take one prominent example of an asset-based 
policy, governments might establish savings funds at birth for 
each  child  and  capitalize  each  account  with  (for  example) 
$1,000, in expectation that the value of the fund will  steadily 
grow over time and represent a significant source of funds by 
early adulthood; a version of this policy (the Child Trust Fund) 
has been implemented in the UK. Ackerman and Alstott  have 
offered a much more ambitious proposal in the context of the 
United States, calling on government to provide all citizens at 
age 18 with an $80,000 “stake,” on the view that having access 
to  such  significant  funds  would  dramatically  alter  the  life 
prospects and plans of many disadvantaged, working-class, and 
even middle-class young Americans.50
Most  of  the  mainstream  discussion  of  asset-based  policies 
focuses on individual accounts and on bolstering access to cash 
savings or  housing.  Advocates  of property-owning democracy 
should also naturally have  an  interest  in  ways  of  broadening 
ownership  of  productive capital.  Government  support  (in  the 
form of loans,  technical assistance,  and in some cases capital 
investments)  for  smaller  businesses  represents  one  traditional 
policy approach; another possibility is the provision of funds or 
incentives to allow individuals to buy corporate stock. More far-
reaching  are  efforts  to  turn  control  over  entire  enterprises  to 
workers  or  to  local  neighbourhood  organizations.  As  Gar 
Alperovitz  has  documented,  both  employee  ownership  and 
community  ownership  (through  vehicles  such  as  community 
development  corporations)  of  productive  businesses  have 
increased dramatically in  the  United States  since the 1970s.51 
Both  approaches  broaden  the  ownership  of  capital  in  ways 
stable long-term basis for limiting inequalities and broadening prosperity 
than relying primarily on continual, large-scale progressive taxation.
49 See Sherraden (2005) for a thorough discussion.
50 Ackerman and Alstott (1999). 
51 Alperovitz (2004, 2006).
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consistent with property-owning democracy, as well as offering 
other possible benefits in addition (such as sustaining jobs in 
poorer or declining localities). 
In short, there are numerous practical mechanisms available to 
policymakers to attempt to broaden access to capital;  most of 
these mechanisms are potentially politically popular and capable 
of winning support from a range of ideological positions. The 
literature  lacks,  however,  a  sustained  treatment  of  how such 
policies  might  be  broadened  and  ratcheted  up  to  scale  in  a 
manner  which  might  realize  the  aims  of  property-owning 
democracy. Ackerman and Alstott’s stakeholder society proposal 
and  Alperovitz’s  arguments  on  behalf  of  a  “pluralist 
commonwealth” come the closest in this regard, though neither 
proposal  explicitly  uses  the  language  of  “property-owning 
democracy.” In short, there is ample room for further work in 
translating the very ambitious aims of Rawlsian (or alternative 
republican)  conceptions  of  property-owning  democracy  into 
concrete political proposals.
Similarly,  there  has  been almost  no  serious discussion  of  the 
politics of  property-owning  democracy or  of  the  question  of 
whether  and  how existing  “welfare  state  capitalist”  societies 
might be changed into a form of market society more closely 
approximating  property-owning  democracy.  Two  observations 
are in order here: first, the social basis for a movement towards 
property-owning democracy is likely to be quite different than 
traditional  left  coalitions  on  behalf  of  socialism  and  social 
democracy;  the aims of property-owning democracy are quite 
different in emphasis (though arguably not inconsistent with) the 
traditional goals of labour and labour organizations. Indeed, the 
more  entrepreneurial,  individualistic  tenor  of  property-owning 
democracy coheres with Roberto Unger’s call for the “left” to 
cast  its  lot  with  the  “petty bourgeoisie”  rather  than declining 
industrial working classes.52 In practice, a workable politics of 
property-owning  democracy  would  need  to  be  blended  with 
other policies and initiatives more oriented towards traditional 
labour concerns about  employment  stability,  wage levels,  and 
labour law.
Second,  while  proposals  to  create  Child  Trust  Funds  and 
broaden  access  to  homeownership  are  generally  popular,  the 
most  crucial  step towards a Rawlsian conception of property-
owning  democracy—more  aggressive,  stringent  taxation  on 
inheritance  and  estates—is  likely  to  inspire  much  more 
opposition. This is especially true in the United States, where a 
concerted effort by conservative ideologues over the past fifteen 
years  has  succeeded  in  persuading  many  Americans  and 
lawmakers  that  inheritance  taxes  represent  an  unjust  “death 
tax”53; there is also substantial opposition to inheritance tax in 
countries  such as  the  UK.54 Serious arguments  for  full-blown 
property-owning democracy thus must be combined with serious 
and persuasive arguments regarding the legitimacy of breaking 
up large estates  through inheritance taxes  and other  forms of 
wealth taxation.55 The argument for the justice of taxing large-
scale wealth in order to secure the fair value of political liberties, 
institute meaningful equal opportunity,  and improve the lot of 
the least well off in turn mirrors the larger Rawlsian argument 
for  understanding  society  as  a  system  of  social  cooperation 
aimed at realizing a common life characterized by fairness, as 
52 Unger (2006).
53 Shapiro and Graetz (2005).
54 See O’Neill (2007); White (2008).
55 For a promising argument along these lines, see Alperovitz and Daly 
(2008).
opposed to a game in which the aim is to accumulate as many 
assets as possible within the permissible rules. The argument for 
breaking  up  large  inheritances  and  the  argument  for  viewing 
society  as  a  fair  system  of  cooperation  are  inextricably  tied 
together. Without the prior commitment to viewing society as a 
fair  system of  social  cooperation,  arguments  for  breaking  up 
large  inheritances  are  dramatically  weakened;  without  the 
political capacity to break up large accumulations of wealth in 
practice, Rawlsian aspirations for realizing a just society based 
on the two principles of justice will remain tantalizingly out of 
reach.
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